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Introduction
Partitioned Histories, Divided Identities

n the summer of 1951, Laila Ahmed returned to Calcutta, the city
of her birth. Before the Partition of India in 1947, she had ~arried
Lt Hyat Rizvi, a naval officer in the Royal Indian Navy, and hke any
dutiful wife had followed her husband to Karachi when he decided to
1
opt
' for service in Pakistan. However, domestic difficulties and marital
discord forced her to return home and she filed for divorce in August
1951 at the Calcutta High Court. Laila's story should have ended with
the dissolution of her marriage. Instead, it became entangled in the
processes of establishing the new nations of India and Pakistan in the
aftermath of the Partition. Her move from one country to another and
her subsequent return raised questions about her rightful domicile,
national identity, and citizenship.
In the absence of any rules and regulations that defined Indian
citizenship legally, Laila's status within India was guided by the
Succession Act of 19252 which dictated that the domicile of the
wife followed that of her husband. Indian officials in Calcutta thus
determined that Laila Ahmed had Pakistani domicile until the last date
of her marriage and had, by virtue of living with her husband until
that date, become a Pakistani citizen. However, they argued that with
the dissolution of her marriage, she did not automatically regain her
Indian citizenship. She had to re-acquire this nationality. The matter
was further complicated by the fact that until the Indian Citizenship
Act was passed in 1955, the official policy in India dictated: 'no one
can acquire Indian nationality except by birth or marriage'. 3 Laila was
thus in identity limbo, one of a growing number of people without
nations who were unsure whether they were citizens of India or
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Pakistan, because of the ambiguities associated with what determined
such citizenship.
The processes of establishing new national orders in the aftermath
of the Partition entailed that minorities-Hindus in Pakistan and
Muslims in India-had to renegotiate their identities as rightful citizens.
This book focuses on minorities such as Laila and examines issues of
territoriality, identity, migration, citizenship, and the subsequent
reordering of national identities in India and East Pakistan (presentday Bangladesh). The narrative begins in 194 7 with the Partition,
and ends with the second Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, by which time
citizens of each country had to make their permanent domicile in
one or the other country.
There were three pa11itions in 1947-of British India and of the
provinces of Bengal and Punjab-that created the new nation-states of
India and a spatially fragmented West and East Pakistan. It engendered
the largest recorded population transfer in history amidst horrific mass
violence. Between 1946 and 1965, nearly 9 million I !indus and Sikhs
moved into India and approximately 5 million Muslims moved to
both parts of Pakistan. 4 Partition as the twin facet of freedom remains
an apocalyptic event within the South Asian popular imagination,
reinforced by family and personal memories of violence, exile,
movement, and resettlement.
Bengal's Pa11ition, which is the focus of this book, entailed that
approximately two-thirds of its area was carved out to create East
Pakistan. It produced the longest international border between two
countries in South Asia and mill ions of new citizens who were marked
as majorities and minorities based on religious demography. Unlike
the Punjab division, with its large-scale horrific violence and swift
exchange of minority populations, the Bengal Partitio n witnessed
protracted migration of Hindu and Muslim minorities engendered
partly by routine small-scale violence and partly by the new states'
attempts to decide the fate of their respective minority populations. It
meant that it took almost two decades after the Partition of India and
Pakistan to map and delineate their territories, determine who could
and could not be their citizens, and implement laws which would
constitute the national identities of their respective citizens. A focus
on the longue duree of Partition's impact not only allows us to better
realize the impe1fect and unfinished nature of post-Partition initiatives
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by the new States of 1ndia and Pakistan, but also to put in historical
context, the actions of ordina1y men and women living during these
extraordinary times.
Rather than framing I 94 7 as the 'break' between colonial and
post-colonial histories of South Asia, or as the year that marked the
'moment of arrival', 5 this book joins new histories of the Partition/'
which sees it as a process rather than a single event, thereby unsettling
time and region-bound nationalized histories. Partition continued to
influence and modify State policies and people's lives beyond 1947.
rurther, the book uses a cross border analysis to show that rather than
dissociating from each other after 194 7, both India and East Pakistan
were intricately linked in their projects to establish respective postPartition national orders.
Two specific understandings about their new citizens in divided
Bengal informed most official policies of the Indian and East
Pakistani states. First, they continued to operate within colonial
understandings of community identity as primarily a function of
religion. Thus, state policies ossified religious affiliation and viewed
their citizenry as either a member of the majority and minority
communities. Second, both states perceived of a specific paradigm of
Partition violence, which viewed the large-scale and cataclysmic riots
in Punjilb of 194 7-8 as standard, informed, and influenced policies
with regard to both minority nationals and refugees. Since the
small-scale ilnd chronic nature of violence in post-Partition Bengal
remained outside this paradigm, the Bengal Partition became, in the
eyes of the post-colonial states, a site of illegitimate victim hood ilnd
unwarranted migration.
In post-Partition Bengal, the discourse over citizenship animated
the project of 'nationalizing the nation'.? Who were the rightful
citizens of the new nations and how could such claims be justified?
Did minorities, the Hindus in East Pakistan and the Muslims in
India, by crossing the international border become refugees and have
automatic rights to demand citizenship? I ilfgue that the new niltion
states or their minorities did not assume such identities and issues of
citizenship. Rather, they were produced categories, debated within the
hallowed halls of officialdom in Delhi, Calcutta, and Dacca, and given
legal sanction through ordinances and laws debated and passed by
parliamentary and state legislations.
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Defining categories of identity such as evacuees, refugees, displaced
persons, aliens, and infiltrators was a major element of the process
of establishing post-Partition national orders and turning colonial
subjects into national citizens. Further, these identities were produced
discursively, mediated through the actions of officials located at the
periphery of the nation, especially at the borders and diplomatic
missions. Refugee documents, border slips, and passports became the
means through which the Indian State sought to differentiate between
refugees, migrants, aliens, and citizens. Legislations surrounding
the rights to own and transfer property became intrinsic within the
renegotiations of nationality in East Pakistan. Implicit within these
redefinitions were the attempts of each state to establish a minority
citizen's loyalty to the state. The determination of such loyalty was
susceptible to contingent political, social, and economic contexts and
was predicated on successful negotiations between minorities and the
nation states.
While Indian and East Pakistani state policies contributed
substantially in constituting new identities in divided Bengal, minority
citizens were by no means passive bystanders to such top-down
processes. Rather, as the book shows, minority citizens-Hindus in
East Pakistan and Muslims in West Bengal-repeatedly contested
official attempts to define national territory and identity through their
persistent movement across the border, protests against requisition of
houses, rallies to demand rehabilitation, and continuation of family
ties across the border. Moreover, it was the everyday interactions
between majority and minority communities, now predicated on new
ideas of belonging and nationality, that produced a protracted state
of uncertainty and fear amongst the latter, and continued to influence
contingent decisions to move from one's home and to become evacuees
or refugees in another country.

PARTITION AND ITS PRE-HISTORIES
The extensive scholarship on the Partition is problematic in several
crucial aspects. The Partition serves as a template for the reinvention
of national histories within India and Pakistan. In these national
narratives, Partition is represented as the momentous culmination
of an anti-colonial national struggle that acceded to the division for
the sake of a larger Indian unity, or as a unilinear movement towards
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national self-representations of distinct communities. Paradoxically,
while Partition persists as the defining moment for those engaged in
reinterpreting cultural and national identities in contempormy South
Asia, Partition historiography remains trapped within a teleological
and chronological barrier of 194 7 . This axiomatic end date for
historical enquiry has led to the creation of 'pre-histories' of the
PartitionH-to an obsessive focus on the high politics that preceded
the event in an attempt to explain wily it happened" and to assign
'responsibility' 10 either to the negotiations between the British and
the major Indian political parties-the Indian National Congress and
the Muslim League-or to the actions of leading political figures such
as Lord Mountbatten, Jawaharlal Nehru, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. 11 The contradictions inherent within anticolonial nationalism, between nation, religion, and group identity,
were sought to be resolved through the construction of Muslim
separatism or 'communalism' as the evil doppelganger of 'secular'
nationalism.
In the late 1980s, historical enquiry on the Partition shifted its
focus from the national to the provincial arena. 12 However, the
historiographical focus remained firmly directed at the level of
provincial high politics. In the case of Bengal, such enquiry involved
a reassessment of provincial identity politics in the 1940s vis-a-vis
national politics. The political dissensions between the all-India
platforms of the Congress and the League and their provincial
counterparts are now well documented l.l as scholars focused on
different points within Bengali politics that marked the decisive turn
away from anti-colonial nationalism towards the path to separatism
or communalism.14
One of the paradigmatic problems that has haunted the
historiography of the Partition is this communal-national binary
that seeks to explain communalism as the causal force that, at
the expe nse of nationalism, marked the inevitable path towards
Partition. 15 In the case of Bengal, one of the main proponents of the
communalism - nationalism bina1y is Joya Chatterji, who explains the
Bengal Partition as an event that Hindu communalism engendered.
She argues that th e public demands for a separate 'hom eland for
Bengali Hindus' on the eve of Partition reflected the end result of a
decisive shift 'from nationalism to communalism' that had marked
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Bengal politics and identity from the 1930s. 16 Chatterji attributes a
central role to elite Bengali Hindus in spearheading the campaign that
led to the fateful division of the province in 1947. Having identified
the main actors in the promotion of Hindu communalism, she then
makes the problematic leap to make the case for all Bengali Hindus
who, in her view, were not 'passive bystanders'. 17 Chatterji's larger
argument provides a convenient historical trajectory to this colonial
representation and seeks to explain the religious demographic
calculations behind the Partition as a process that reflected inherent
divisions within the Indian socio-political milieu. Partition, thus, was
inevitable not only because Indian leaders such as Nehru, PateL and
Jinnah forced the British hand but also because of the intrinsic and
age-old communal fault lines. Such arguments not only tend to deflect
the role of British politics in India, but they also provide no space
for the examination of alternatives to the nationalism-communalism
binary. IS
That provincial politics in Bengal saw an increasing presence of elite
Hindu and Muslim communalism cannot be denied. From the 1930s
onwards, Hindu organizations began to mobilize lower-caste groups,
such as the Namasudras in Bengat within the larger Hindu fold. 19 The
subsequent shifts in class and community relations were critical in
garnering support for the Partition. Organizing the Muslim peasantry
in Bengal along communitarian lines also involved mobilization along
class divisions.2o These factors do not necessarily indicate that public
discourse and political rhetoric in the 1930s and the 1940s assumed
a Hindu or Muslim identity at the expense of anti-colonial nationalist
agitation. Rather, nationalist leaders had strategically deployed both
Hindu and Muslim religious symbols in their efforts to incorporate
the masses since at least 1905. The anti-colonial nationalism of both
Bengali Hindus and Muslims had always been influenced and informed
by religion and religious symbols. 21 However, a critical distinction
needs to be made between the communitarian struggles of non-elite
social groups in which religion played an important organizational
role and the communal mobilizations within provincial politics
informed by colonial constructions of politically representative
religious groups.22
Religion as the raison d'etre of the politics of Partition becomes
problematic when the focus shifts to the eastern part of Bengal. The
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East Bengal/East Pakistan story is subsumed within a broader schema
of Partition historiography that fails to appreciate that for some
Muslim Bengalis, the Partition was a way to emerge from Hindu
domination and experience cultural autonomy as a Muslim and a
Bengali. 23 However, such explanations lead to yet another. kind of prehistory that seeks to explain the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 as a
repudiation of arguments in favour of Muslim or Hindu communalism.
Unfortunately, the narrative of Bangladeshi nationhood has not only
erased the Partition of 1947 from public memory there, but also
rewritten the history to locate the birth of the Mus! im Bengali 'national
24
self-consciousness' from the first Partition of Bengal in 1905.
In recent years, academic scholarship has shifted away from the
pre-histories of Partition to its immediate impact, from causality to 'lived
experience', 25 in order to render a human and gendered narrative of the
Partition and its aftermath.26 Ethnographic studies focus on the period
leading up to the Partition and its immediate repercussions on the
experiences of the displaced and on the narratives of the horrific acts
of rape, violence, and murder, both between and within communities
in the Punjab. These studies have conclusively established the gendered
nature of Partition violence as it targeted women as symbols of their
community and family honour. 27 The most important contribution of
these writings has been to draw attention to the disjuncture between
national histories of the Partition and the personal narratives of 194 7
and to reveal the multiple ways in which the latter contest and subvert
the former. Communities and local traditions reconstituted themselves
through the language of Partition violence that privileged a particular
reconstruction of the past. 28 Collective and individual memories of
violence are also mediated along caste, class, and gendered lines.
Scholarly enquiry has thus shifted emphasis from the structural
analysis of Partition violence to the analysis of modalities of memory
and forgetting of such brutality.
The focus is now on Partition and its impact on subcontinental
nations, cities, and their citizens.29 Partition and its outcomes, as recent
research shows, were products of hasty planning within high politics
and contingent decisions of millions who attempted to make sense
of their new status as citizens of new countries after 1947. Rather
than neatly marking the end of colonialism and the beginning of
nationhood in India and Pakistan, Partition, within this scholarly shift,
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appears as unfinished, messy, and protracted, continuing to influence
the identities of those who were the most affected by the division.
However, like the earlier binaries of communalism versus
nationalism, recent scholarship has tended to examine post-colonial
nationhood through yet another binary: secular state versus nonsecular, especially in the case of India. The focus has been on examining
the Hindu majoritarian underpinnings of Indian secularism and the
imperfect implementations of such ideals when it came to its citizens. 30
Zamindar's excellent study of the aftermath of Partition in Karachi
and Delhi falls within this category in its examination of official
policies designed to control migration after Partition. She captures the
uncertain status of those caught on the wrong side of the border, as they
negotiated the documentary terrain of peimits, passports, and evacuee
property that were instituted by both India and Pakistan to prevent
migration and return of Muslims in Pakistan and India respectively. In
the process, she questions both the proclaimed secular identity of the
new Indian State as well as the assertions of the Pakistani state that it
was the homeland of all Muslims. 31
Zamindar's central thesis of 'governmentality' as primary in
engendering national difference sits awkwardly when one shifts focus to
the division in the east. In post-Partition Bengal, state legislations were
kept to a minimum32 but efforts to control the chronic and protracted
migration produced parallel ideas about nationality. Here, too, as
another recent book by Joya Chattetii highlights,33 Muslim minorities
in West Bengal were ghettoized and dispossessed as in Delhi, and
minorities, both Hindus and Muslims,' had to juggle multiple identities
as they crossed the border or attempted to return home. However,
even as they became a minority, Chatterji argues, in subsequent years,
the Muslims in West Bengal became critical to the political balance
within the province as no political party could afford to ignore this
significant vote bank. Similarly, Hindu refugees from East Pakistan were
active agents who demanded rehabilitation from the Indian State as
a matter of human right and became significant in the emergence of
Left politics in West Bengal.34
This book joins both Zamindar.and Chatterji in their examination
of the impact of the Partition on those living in the divided regions.
However, it differs from such scholarship on two crucial aspects.
First; although it examines official policies in India and East Pakistan
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that were significant in defining and imposing national identities on
minorities, this book, additionally, shows that contingent actions
and decisions of lower-level functionaries, minorities, and refugees
were central to how such new configurations of citizenship and
belonging came into being. Rather than being passive victims of
state legislations, these ordinary citizens manipulated legal clauses to
better able to manage their status, and negotiated, complained, and
sometimes ignored official dictates. Their ultimate migration and/
or dispossession in the subsequent decades of the Partition were a
result of the combined effects of state policies and individual and
group action contingent on the continuation of routine violence in
the region. In this respect, this book highlights the role of Partition
itself, rather than of regional particularities, in reconstituting national
identities for minorities.
Second, this book takes a cross-border perspective in its analysis of
both official policies and individual actions. It shows that minorities,
be it Hindus in East Pakistan or Muslims in West Bengal, faced
similar sets of discriminatory circumstances and questions of national
belonging. A cross-border analysis further allows to provide a counter
to India and Pakistan's projects of nationalizing their respective citizens
by showing that for most ordinary men and women, the border
served utilitarian purposes rather than defining the limits of each
nation. New citizenships were, for them, functional at best and they
retained old ties of wealth, kinship, and local identity even after new
nationalities had been imposed on them through the documentary
regime of passports and visas.
The aftermath of the Partition in Bengal presents us with several
ways to understand the larger impact of the Partition counter to what
have become the two normative paradigms of the Partition experience
in South Asia. First, Partition in these analyses remains regionally
confined in their analyses of the Punjab division.3 5 Second, they
assume that for the most part, the large-scale violence engendered
migrations and renegotiations of citizenship and belonging. Although
violence was integral to how the Partition affected people's lives, it was
not, as new studies have revealed, the only experience.36
The low-scale routine violence in divided Bengal fits awkwardly
within this effort to represent and rewrite a specific subcontinental
partition experience. This is not to suggest that the Partition of Bengal
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has not received any attention within academic scholarship, but such
attention has been primarily focused on the rehabilitation of refugees
from East Pakistan into India.
This book argues that such differences in relief and rehabilitation
policies stem from the understanding of violence as cataclysmic and
physical and the attempt to define refugees as victims of such violence.
This understanding of Partition violence, which characterized the
Punjab experience but not the small-scale chronic violence in Bengal,
influenced refugee rehabilitation policies of the Indian State. The
Indian State thus considered the migration of Bengali refugees to be
unwarranted, and consequently viewed these individuals as illegitimate
candidates for rehabilitation. It viewed these refugees primarily as
economic migrants rather than as victims of violence or simply as
persecuted Hindu minorities. Thus, the book suggests a different, more
complicated understanding of the constitution of secular ideals in the
early years of Independence.
The scholarship on refugee rehabilitation itself remains
problematic, as researchers view refugees as an undifferentiated mass
whose experiences of migration and resettlement are similar. While
the socio-economic background of those crossing the borders were
influential in their relocation, the timing of their migration, whether
after 1947, or after the riots of 1950, or beyond, was critical to how
they were viewed by the state and their subsequent rehabilitation.
In actuality, the reconstitution of identities depended on a variety of
factors, some of which were created in collusion with official policies
of the new nation states.37
This book counters such normative understandings of the aftermath
of the Partition, by examining the impact of open borders, laissezfaire state policies, routine violence, and continuous and protracted
migration in the east. It argues that it was migration in the east that
forced India and Pakistan to craft legislations such as the passport
system that ascribed nationality to their minority citizens. However,
the implementation of these legislations continued in a piecemeal
fashion, and minorities in the region consistently faced questions
of loyalty as they negotiated between their residential and national
identity. However, they were often active agents in reshaping their
new identities as they contingently moved back and forth across the
border but kept open the channels of negotiation with the state for
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their rights as citizens, evacuees, and refugees. The aftermath of the
Partition in Bengal thus offers a better template to understand the
protracted processes engendered in 1947. Here, the border remained
porous even after 1952, citizenship continued to be contested even
after the Citizenship Act of 1955, refugees still continued to come after
1958 when the last refugee camp was shut down, and ownership of
property was disputed between the state and who it termed as evacuees
until 1965 when the such property became enemy property.
NEW STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS

Establishing 'national' states was the primary task at hand after the
Partition for India and Pakistan. Both states deployed a range of
symbolic, discursive, and actual methods that produced states as
authoritative entities, which controlled the political and social life
of each nation. In the Indian context, the 'practice of post-colonial
nation-statism' involved visual representations, ritual practices of
commemoration such as the Republic Day parades, discourses ,on
science and technology, and urban planning designs as ways of
constructing the new nation-state. 3B Although far apart, West and
East Pakistan also embarked on the process of nationalizing their
identity through the declaration of Urdu as the national language,
creating a 'political economy of defence' 3 9 and weighing the economy
in favour of the West at the expense of the east. 40 In East Pakistan the
authorities focused on new legislations affecting people and property
in the divided provinces, the appointment of new personnel to
implement these policies, and the investment in, and construction of,
new infrastructure to enable the control and dispersal of state policies
at the periphery.
The legislations that directly impacted the partitioned regions aimed
both at delineating the nations' boundaries and controlling access to
its territories. More importantly, they were instrumental in categorizing
citizens-those who belonged and those who did not. Both India and
Pakistan instituted the permit system in 1948 and the passport and
visa scheme in 1952 that allowed certain groups to refugees to enter
and prevented others from returning back home.41 In addition, evacuee
property laws in both states promised guardianship of abandoned
properties until the time their owners returned, and requisition laws
targeted these very properties as means to rehabilitate refugees from
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the other side. Migration and property became nationalized: the act of
moving from one state to another meant the relinquishing of one's
property, indicating a sort of declaration of intent, a 'natural' inclination
towards the other nation. Interestingly, the Permit system was not put
in operation in the eastern sector with both governments preferring to
keep that border open until the establishment of the Passports in 1952.
Further, the Indian Evacuee Property Legislations did not encompass
properties of refugees in the eastern zone. In spite of such differential
policies, Hindus in East Pakistan and Muslims in West Bengal and
Bihar were prone to be seen as trans-territorial citizens whose loyalty
to their respective nations would always be suspect.
While the focus on official policy and different legislations
provides a window into the creation of post-Partition nations, it is
important to examine the operational aspects of these policies. How
did these legislations, enacted in the capital cities of Delhi, Karachi,
and Dhaka, translate and affect the people they aimed to categorize?
Who were responsible for their implementation? The book focuses
on the actions of intermediaiy officials who were entrusted with
the implementation of these laws, which sought to create strong
and centralized post-Partition states.42 These low-level officials,
often located at a distance from central and higher authorities, had
substantial discretionary power in their districts and towns to interpret
the law as they saw fit. 43
Moreover, they were crucial in determining who could and could
not belong to the nation. This is not to argue that these bureaucrats
necessarily had little regard for the law and were autocratic in
their actions. But in state-society relations, one must recognize the
inherent flexibility of human actions. In the case of divided Bengal,
the interactions of these low-level officials were often informed by
economic and religious imperatives. Thus, even though official policies
and legislations were avowedly non-discriminatory on paper, they
often followed discriminatory paths when implemented by some of
these officials.
State-society relationships are further complicated when one
looks at one of the universal and characteristic features of the
modern nation state: its citizenship, defined primarily through the
group membership of its citizens within a definite territorial unit.
Territory and membership are closely related-the modern state is
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simultaneously a territorial organization and a personal assoaauon.
Citizenship is not a mere reflex of residence; it is an enduring personal
status that is not generated by passing or extended residence alone and
does not lapse with temporary or prolonged absence.45
In the case of divided Bengal, citizenship followed a different path..
Migration from one territorial unit to another, even if temporary',
defined one's nationality; it signalled the intent of acquiring a new
citizenship and simultaneously giving up the original identity. In
the years between the Partition and the enactment of appropriate
legislation laying down the regulations and definitions of citizenship
in India and Pakistan, individuals who crossed the border had to
constantly negotiate the ambiguities surrounding their migration,
residence, and putative and 'natural' national identity.
The initial policy of the Government of India had been to alloW
citizenship rights to those migrants who officially declared their
intention to become citizens. of India and later acquired the necessary
documentation. Getting one's name on the electoral rolls was one
of the primary ways to ensure subsequent citizenship rights. Such a
policy presented two contradictory dilemmas for Indian authorities.
On the one hand, by allowing any migrant to acquire citizenship,
it could limit its rehabilitation responsibilities towards the· refugees.
On the other hand, the government feared that such a policy might
encourage Hindu minorities to opt for migration in such large numbers
that would not only create an economic strain but also threaten the
secular fa<;ade of the Indian State. In order to stem the continuing
tide of migration, the Indian government fixed a time limit by which
46
a refugee/migrant had to declare his/her intention to stay in India,
and in the early 1950s, declared that inclusiOn within the electoral
rolls would not guarantee automatic citizenship rights.
No easy coincidence between citizenship, religious identity, and
the territorial limits of the nation existed. The demand for a Muslim
homeland that had pervaded the countdown to Partition, and its
tangible success embedded within the establishment of Pakistan,
meant that there was an implicit understanding that Muslims would
'naturally' identify with Pakistan, while non-Muslims-Hindus,
Buddhists, Christians, and others--would automatically become
part of India. Consequently, minority Hindus and Muslims who
continued living in Pakistan and India after 1947 became what Willem
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Van Schendel defines as 'proxy citizens'. 47 Minority Hindus in East
Pakistan, though legally citizens of the Pakistan state, were categorized
as putative citizens of the Indian State which endeavoured to ensure
their rights and security through agreements and the establishment
of institutions such as minority boards. Similarly, newspapers in East
Pakistan consistently highlighted the plight of the Muslims in India.
Such trans-territorial concerns were integral to the project of nation
building even as they belied the limits of distinct nationhood and
contradicted the project of secular identities.
For each newly independent state, the security of the minorities
within India and East Pakistan became the acid test of legitimate
nationhood. Minority migration became central to the game of
numerical one-upmanship between India and Pakistan, as each
accused the other of creating conditions that stimulated the protracted
migration on the eastern border. Both countries evolved processes that
sought to quantify the human movement across their mutual border.
At one level, the direction and magnitude of the migration indicated
the successes and failures of India and East Pakistan to establish
their national order. In this game, India claimed a moral edge as the
Census of 1951 recorded that more Hindus had migrated there from
East Pakistan than did Muslim migrants leave India for East Pakistan.
India blamed East Pakistan for not guaranteeing minority right and
the latter countered by accusing India of creating 'pull factors' for
the East Pakistan Hindus, which went counter to its proclaimed
secular identity. Implicit within such accusations was the question
of legitimacy predicated on each state's ability to guarantee equal
citizenship rights to their respective minorities.
For the East Pakistani authorities, migration of its minorities
reflected an intricate weave of loyalty and territory that defined
citizenship not by birth but by domicile. Thus, any movement across
the border was interpreted as inherently disloyal, destabilizing the new
state and siphoning its minimal resources. The very real predicament
of establishing the infrastructure for the new East Pakistani state
was a potent factor within this equation. In 1948, the East Pakistan
state legislated the Evacuee Property Act to assure its minorities that
authorities would guard their property and hand it back to them if
they returned from India. But by the time of Indo-Pakistan war of
1965, the East Pakistan government changed this legislation, pleading
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wartime exigencies that led to the Enemy Property Act of 1965. As
the name suggests, this law usurped the very property that it had,
in the earlier decade, claimed to protect. The historical trajectory of
this metamorphosis highlights the critical connections between state
processes and minority dislocation in post-Partition Bengal.
The chronic and prolonged nature of the migration from the east
illustrates that even as minorities in West Bengal and East Pakistan
developed into trans-territorial citizens in the eyes of each state, such
identities remained negotiable at the individual level. Hindu and
Muslim minorities identified with the state of their co-religionists only
under extreme circumstances when they perceived that their territorial
nation could not guarantee their citizenship rights in the face of threats
from extra-state actors. Thus, for East Pakistani Hindus, migration was
not always predicated on permanent uprooting but on the belief that
they would be able to retain their kinship and social ties with their
ancestral homes. They were also following the traditional pattern of
urban-rural migration that took place in the region during colonial
times. In the past, there had been the possibility of return. However,
the requirements of post-Partition states to define their boundaries
and identify their loyal citizens made it almost impossible for the
continuance of such ties. Similarly, within the communally charged
environment of India's relations with the princely states of Kashmir
and Hyderabad in 1947-8, the issue of loyalty became controversial
for the minority Muslims of West Bengal. As members of a community
that had been closely connected with the demand for Pakistan, they
easily became the usual suspects in regard to anti-state activities. The
Bengal Partition, thus, generated a unique form of trans-territoriality
where national citizenship was defined by domicile, but religious
community defined proxy citizenship. This duality reinforced the
marginality of minorities as loyal citizens of their territorial nation.
THE NATION'S BORDERLANDS
The establishment of international borders was the sine qua non of the
Partition enterprise. The impossible task of determining a border in six
weeks to accommodate religious demography was delegated to Cyril
Radcliffe. a British civil servant with little knowledge of the Indian
subcontinent. Radcliffe was the chairman of the five-member Boundary
Commission which was hampered by unclear and contradictory terms
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of reference.~~ The conflicting claims of the leading political parties
and a restricted schedule of six weeks made their task more difficult.
Although maps are essential tools of knowledge and control,
defining not only topography but also the conceptual nation; 19 the
new borders and their creation in 1947 have since been peripheral
both within political discourses on nation building and, until recently,
within scholarly accounts. Ironically, within post-1947 South Asia,
accur.lte maps were largely non-existent because India, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh restricted and continue to restrict public access to maps
under claims of national security. Such cartographic anxieties, whose
underlying fear is that of national disintegration, are clearly a legacy
of the Partition. Despite such difficulties, recent studies have managed
to elaborate on the uncertainty and confusion that were fundamental
to the establishment of the line of divisionso Expediency rather
than accuracy guided British decolonization efforts in 194 7. Thus,
the accuracy of colonial maps and the basic realities of the ultimate
border mattered less than the fa<;ade that the Hounda1y Commission
had deliberated and resolved issues along democratic principles."' The
process of creating the border encompassed both the desire for an
honourable withdrawal on the part of the British and the first steps
among Indian and Pakistani leaders to map the contours of their
respective nations. The final determination thus reflected the political
and personal imperatives of those who were intimately connected
with its deliberation." 2
Not surprisingly, the boundary awards, published two days after
15 August 1947, failed to meet most expectations and unsettled the
regional societies of Punjab and Bengal. Recent scholarship has begun
to trace the impact of the border on the lives of those living in and
around the border, and have questioned the claims of 'closed' national
boundaries by focusing on the movement of border dwellers which
continuously tested the irrevocability of political boundaries. The
porosity of borders, especially the one in divided Bengal, meant that
there was a gap between the rhetoric of border maintenance, of its
absoluteness and success in excluding and including certain groups,
and the reality of life at the border. Scholars such as Schendel and
Baud have urged for a focus on the borderland as a unit of analysis
rather than only the borders 3 An examination of borderlands as
a site of interaction and negotiation between people from both

18 Partitioned Lives

sides serves as an important corrective to the unchanging and linear
representation of the border on maps. Further, the borderland defined
itself as a vibrant site of economic activity even as the new nation
states endeavoured to criminalize such activities. In divided Bengal,
the border simultaneously evolved as a barrier to work and a site of
new employment for state-appointed officials, militias, and armed
. 54
forces who were called upon to guard the new national fronuers.
Borders generally define both the origin and the territorial limits
of imagined national communities. After Partition, identities at the
periphery had to simultaneously negotiate the emergence of the South
Asian region as a 'unified' entitySS and the reflexive nationalisms that
critically depended on each other for self-definition. In the case of the
Bengal border, there was no clear correlation between territory and
national identity. Identities were produced not so much by the physical
location of the border but more due to India and Pakistan's attempt
to control the movement of border crossers. This book focuses on
the emergence of a document regime of passports, visas, migration
certificates, and refugee slips which aimed to count and classify
border crossers into different categories of belonging vis-a-vis the new
nation states. Thus, border crossers now could be officially classified
as temporary or permanent migrants, refugees, infiltrators, aliens, or as
citizens depending on what kind of documentation they were able to
obtain. Those who crossed without documentation faced the possibility
of deportation but that happened rarely in the first few decades after
the Partition. While the emergence of d0(ument-ary identity at the
6
border was similar to processes in Europe after the First World War5
where such documents were central to the emergence of citizenship,
different conditions in Bengal entailed that these documents held a
more utilitarian value to the border crossers even as India and Pakistan
hoped to equate some of these documents with citizenship.
In Bengal, there was no 'natural' succession of laws to control
the border once the line had been drawn on the map. In contrast to
the western boundary, Indian authorities in New Delhi and Calcutta
did not view an 'open' Bengal border as a threat to India's security.
The Bengal border thus evolved primarily as an economic frontier
immediately after 1947, and remained legally open until 1952
when the continuous migration of East Bengali Hindu refugees who
dem.anded the 'right' to rehabilitation from India led the Indian
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government to take action to close the border in the east. The need
to control this 'unending trail' ensured that by the mid-1950s, the
border assumed territorial sanctity in official discourse and action.
This book argues that the processes of delineating the political and
territorial jurisdiction of the nation state enabled the emergence of
national identity as the principal axis of state control over mobility
and citizenship.

SOURCES AND PARAMETERS
'Destroyed by white ants and water'-this was one of the many similar
descriptive entries in one of the catalogues at the State Archives in West
Bengal. 5 7 Although only sixty years old, documents relating to the postPanition period in India and Bangladesh have remained inaccessible
pa11ly because some files continue to be restricted to the researchers,
panly because records were dispersed to different archives and libraries
after 194 7, and pa11ly because of the deteriorating conditions in these
archives which ensure that termites become responsible for destroying
both papers and histories of three nations. Researching for this book
took me to numerous archives across four countries in Bangladesh,
India, the United Kingdom and the United States. Archival sources in
Bangladesh and India are fragmented, eiTatic, kept in dilapidated archival
storage in different cities, and sometimes in different locations of the
same city. Representing the fractured beginnings of India and Pakistan,
these sources primarily comprise 'official' voices: files containing memos,
legislations, official directives of various ministries in India, East Pakistan,
and Britain which kept up a healthy interest in its erstwhile Indian
empire; local police records which noted movements and activities of
'suspicious elements'; parliamentary debates recording differing opinions
of legislators; and private papers of the principal political parties.
But read closely, one finds that these official files contain 'unofficial'
voices, of ordinary people who sent in letters, memoranda, and
petitions to their official and political representatives demanding
amelioration of their particular grievances within the context of
becoming new citizens. These hithe110 ignored voices retlect and
represent the experience of Panition as much as government records
and high politics dictated its official trajectory. Although both official
and unofficial records come with their attendant epistemological
problems, I have attempted to read them 'against the grain', to
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highlight the contingent conditions under which ordinary dtiz~ns of
India and East Pakistan lived and experienced post-Partition projects
of the two nations. In conjunction with personal .memoirs and oral
nar.ratives that were recorded in the 1960~, such sources ·provide us
with the mentalite of the post-Partition period. ·Further, when read as
a dialogue between ordinary citizens and state policies, such sources
provide insights into the nature and limits of state....-society relations
in post-colonial South Asia.
Newspaper reports and police records have been invaluable sources
in piecing together the arc of India and Pakistan's official policies and
public statements on various issues relating to border disputes, acts of
violence, riots, and refugee relief. Further, newspapers also published
letters from concerned individuals who used them as a public forum
to raise· awareness and share opinion on specific · issues. Although
such sources come with their own set of issues regarding veracity and
were sometimes clearly embellished accounts1 i ha~e used them not
for factual data but as re~ords indicating the multiple possibilities
and contingencies that existed within the con~emporary public 'sphere.
Given the constraints of the recorded sources this book draws on the
border between West Bengal anp East Paki~tan. as representative. of
border experiences between 1947 and 196s.ss ·
Further, it examines post-Partition legislations that did not always
have a parallel correspondence in both India and East Pakistan. For
example, the Evacuee Property Act was in operation in East Pakistan
but India's Evacuee Property Act did not include areas in Bengal
and Al?sam, primarily because the official expectation at the time of
Partition was that there would be very little migration and hence no
need for rehabilitation on the eastern side.
Because Partition elicited a divided Pakistan, for the sake of this
study, I have used 'East Paki~tan' to denote the geographical entity and
used Pakistan and the Government of East Paldstan ·interchangeably to
denote its official s(atur~. I have used the term 'East Bengal' to correctly
denote the same region up until1956 when it officially became 'East
Pakistan'. The Pakistan central government was located and concerned
primarily with legislations and politics in West Pakistan and for most
.. purposes; East Pakistan dealt with its inter dominion relations with
India on its OWn. However, this is ''n ot to say that it had m,u ch say or
influence on'·how national Pakistani policy was framed.
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The book is divided into three thematic sections, each containing
two chapters. The first section focuses on the theme of territoriesboth the delineation of a national border in Bengal and the diverse
ways in which India and Pakistan sought to control movement across
this border. On 3 June 1947, political leaders in India and Britain
informed their citizens that India would gain independence by 1948
and would also be partitioned into two nations, namely, India and
Pakistan. Within days of this momentous announcement, the date
of independence was brought forward to 14-15 August 1947. The
blueprint for decolonization and independence required the setting
up of a Boundary Commission to establish a new national border.
Chapter 1 examines in detail the deliberations of both the officially
constituted Boundary Commission and the public debates surrounding
its inception. It contends that even though the logic of the Partition
demand was predicated on religious demography, the public and
political demands for territory had little to do with communal
concerns. The new border drawn at independence failed miserably
both at separating Hindus from Muslims and as a distinct marker of
national jurisdiction.
Although it was clearly defined on paper by August 1947, the border
dividing Bengal took shape over the next two decades. Confusion
about its location and its power to demarcate national sovereignty
meant border conflicts over territory, livestock, and people; smuggled
goods became a common feature of border life almost immediately.
Simultaneously, India and Pakistan attempted to control refugee
movements by requiring new documents such as passports, visas, and
refugee slips as measures to classify and tabulate those who crossed
the border. Chapter 2 explores the emergence and constitution of this
document regime characterized by new forms of marking identity. Pieces
of paper were the means of controlling and categorizing persons who
legally wanted to cross the new international border. It was thus at the
periphery that these nation states began to exercise their newly won
sovereign powers, as they sought to decide who could and could not
enter their territorial boundaries.
The second section examines the processes of nation building in
the aftermath of the Partition which engendered and crafted new forms
of citizenship, new ways of belonging to the new nations. The postPartition period raised critical questions about national belonging: who
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was an Indian and who was a Pakistani?; and on what basis were these
questions to be resolved? Chapter 3 focuses on the Evacuee Property
Act of 1951, promulgated in East Pakistan. It examines how the Act
framed and complicated the ideas of citizenship amongst those who
were primarily affected by its rulings, namely, the minority Hindus.
The Act allowed the Pakistan state to requisition the property of those
whom it viewed as potential evacuees to India. Further, by placing
restrictions on items such as gold, foreign exchange. and even livestock.
the Act redefined the very notion of property, and linked the rights of
citizenship with property ownership and nationality.
The act of migration, even if temporary, served to define one's
nationality. It came to be seen as an indication of one's intent to
acquire a new citizenship and to relinquish one's original identity. In
this process, the same person could be designated an evacuee in one
country and a refugee in another. Neither term guaranteed citizenship
rights. Chapter 4 examines the Citizenship of India Bill, and the official
and public debates surrounding it, in order to trace the development of
the idea of legal citizenship in India. It argues that continued migration
from the east (rather than the west) forced the architects of the Act to
confront the modalities of defining a 'citizen' and to formulate rules
that would directly impact the refugees from East Pakistan and aid in
their transformation to Indians.
The third section addresses the theme of identities, specifically
those of minorities and refugees. Minorities in each nation faced
questions about their supranational identities and had to justify their
decision to remain in their ancestral localities. Religious identity
collided with national identity, as minorities in India and Pakistan
became trans-territorial citizens who resided in one nation but were
alleged to profess loyalty to the other nation, the home of their
religious brethren. Essentially, this was manifested through routine.
small-scale violence that specifically targeted minorities in each
country. Chapter 5 calls for a redefinition of the current paradigmatic
vieW of Partition-generated violence as being large scale and primarily
physical. Rather, in the case of divided Bengal, Partition violence
was daily, small-scale, and often transmuted through psychological
threats, both verbal and written. The routine of violence continued
for two decades after 1947 and engendered migration across borders
both to and from India.
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Partition created another category of people: refugees or the
displaced. In the case of Bengal, as Chapter 6 shows, the Indian
State operated on the belief that migration from East Pakistan was
unwarranted and temporary. Rehabilitation policies thus were ad
hoc, limited, and had the expectation that refugees would be able to
self-rehabilitate, albeit with the help of Indian State. In the light of
policy failure, it was easy for the emergence of a paradoxical entity:
the Bengali refugee, who was lazy yet pioneering, shorn of agency yet
subversive, and who dung on to his 'refugee' identity yet demanded
the rights of citizenship.
The following chapters hope to present an analysis of how India
and East Pakistan engaged with their post-Partition predicaments
that had to square the needs of building distinctive nations and
nationalities with the realities of lack of resources, imperfect and
erratic legislations, and continuous movement of people and goods
which tested the limits of each nation. Categorization of their people
into citizens and foreigners was a necessary part of their nationalizing
projects. It also hopes to present the story of how ordinary people on
both sides of the Radcliffe line, such as Laila Ahmed, were impacted by
such nationalizing projects and how they reacted, adopted, negotiated,
and often ignored such classifications. Luckily for Laila, the Indian
authorities allowed her to stay on with her parents on 'compassionate
grounds' 5 9 until the Citizenship Act was passed and she could acquire
Indian citizenship.
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